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ABSTRACT. In this article I will look into Corporate
Legal Responsibility taking into account Levinas’s notion
of infinite responsibility, as well as his understanding of ethical
language. My account of Levinas’s philosophy will show
that it challenges – breaking down – deeply entrenched
distinctions in the dominant strands of moral philosophy,
within which the theory of individual responsibility is
embedded, such as between:(1) duty to others on the one
hand and supererogation on the other; (2) perfect duty to
others on the one hand and imperfect duties to others on the
other; (3) insiders and outsiders; kith and kin on the one
hand and strangers on the other; Levinas’s moral vision is an
inclusive one which embraces all of humanity (at least of
those present today) irrespective of historical, linguistic,
cultural differences and diversities. In other words, each has
responsibilities for and duties towards all others. Of course,
one might say that there is nothing new about a univer-
salising ethics – after all Kantianism, liberalism as well as
utilitarianism are well known instances. However, more
crucially, all these traditional moral philosophies uphold the
theory of individual responsibility, which is rooted in the
philosophy of individualism. Such a philosophy can make
sense only of the concept of individual moral/legal agency
but not corporate agency. Therefore, in this article I will
attempt to show that the Levinasian vision is able to help us
change our view with respect to corporate responsibility.
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Introduction
If the spirit of the Levinasian account of infinite
responsibility for the Other were to filter through to
individual and social consciousness, then, perhaps,
the powerful cultural resistance to corporate
responsibility/culpability would be eroded.1 Society
and its legal system (such as that in England and
Wales), as well as its moral outlook would be more
ready to accept that corporations could be found
guilty of even manslaughter, and be duly punished
for it (as in the case of the Herald of Free Enterprise
and similar tragedies)2, or that they could be said to
be morally responsible for the deaths/harm caused.
Levinas has also argued against the view – a denial –
that morality is grounded solely on autonomy,
freedom and reason, and that moral obligation rests
essentially on reciprocity. His two-pronged strategy –
affirmation on the one hand and denial on the
other – opened the way for his central notion of
infinite responsibility for the Other which in turn can
be defended against the charge of either unintelligi-
bility or absurdity. It is the reason I will raise a few
more Levinasian concepts, which are particularly
germane to the respective discussions of corporate
legal responsibility.
Justice and sociality
Levinas agrees with Heidegger that philosophy is
more than a method, rather that it is ‘‘a way of
becoming aware of where we are in the world
(Kearney (1984): 49)’’. Nevertheless, he held that
the whole of Western tradition of philosophy,
including Heidegger, has gone astray, because for
Levinas ethics appears as first philosophy, and not
only ontology or the study of Being – ‘‘Morality is
not a branch of philosophy, but first philosophy
(Levinas, 1967).’’ Levinas does not prescribe an
ethic, his philosophy is far from being normative;
nevertheless, by his descriptions and analyses, the
ethical perspective is the starting point of his phi-
losophy. The awakening for ethics happens, when
the agent becomes aware of a responsibility, which is
beyond his/her control, of a desire for the Other.
Furthermore, infinity, is really another name for
responsibility for the Other.
This latter point is brought out by Levinas’s
emphasis on ethics as first philosophy, rejecting the
dominant view of individual responsibility which is
based on a sense of the self, as a spontaneous
(autonomous/free/rational) being;3 instead he sees
the self (myself) as a being in relation to an other,
who ex hypothesi is not myself (that is, the same), but
whose strangeness and whose irreducibility to the I
(my memories, my thoughts, my feelings as well as
my material possessions) calls precisely into question
my spontaneity and autonomy for free action.
The face (le visage) is irreducible, being primordial;
it encapsulates the Other, as well as its strangeness
and the awareness of otherness on my part.
The face is a living presence; it is expression. The
life of expression consists in undoing the form in
which the existent, exposed as a theme, is thereby
dissimulated. The face speaks. (TI: 66).
The face of the other calls me to justice4 and to
justification. On it is written, as it were, the com-
mands: ‘‘Thou shalt not kill’’, ‘‘Thou shalt love thy
neighbour as thyself’’, ‘‘Thou shalt do all that thou
canst to help the other’’, in spite of the defence-
lessness and powerlessness of the Other. The face,
however, should not be understood merely in terms
of physical characteristics. But it remains true that
physiognomy crucially renders communication
possible between the other and myself.
The basic structure of language is a relationship
between two singularities, ‘‘I’’, and the ‘‘Other’’. In
speaking, the Other is solicited, called upon to
respond. In speech, the I and Other solicit each
other without appropriation. That is, in speech5 or
communication there is the true encounter with the
Other.
Encounter with the Other which occurs in face-
to-face dealings with other human beings also points
beyond itself towards absolute otherness, recognition
of which is recognition of genuine transcendence,
beyond Being, or Otherwise than Being.6 This
absolute other or infinity cannot be comprehended
in the way traditional metaphysics has tried to do; it
is revealed not in intellectual comprehension but in
actual discourse – ‘‘Better than comprehension,
discourse relates with what remains essentially tran-
scendent (TI: 195)’’. Discourse preserves the ‘‘I’’ in
its individuality, as well as the distinctiveness of the
other, the distinction between the same and the
Other.
Ethics for Levinas, is not based on reciprocity (I
acknowledge the demands of others only in return
that they acknowledge my demands upon them), or
on the Golden Rule – to do unto others what you
would like others to do unto you; nor is it a question
of advancing enlightened self-interests. Our obliga-
tions to others do not arise through entering into
contracts with them to protect our mutual interests
or our separate rights. The ‘‘mercantile’’ calculation
of a utilitarian kind, or the rational manoeuvrings of
a Kantian kind, the Nietzschean will to power, or
the Sartrean pursuit of infinite freedom is alien to the
Levinasian orientation. All these perspectives are
profoundly individualistic in orientation, which
begin with, and end at the egocentric starting point,
and therefore the self simply acts to defend itself
from the other while at the same time assaulting the
freedom of others in order to aggrandise itself.
Levinas distinguishes between sociality (and true
society), on the one hand, and society, on the other,
a distinction, which enables him to look at the social
order in a way different from the usual one.7 Society,
commonly understood in modern social philosophy,
amounts to the following:
1. It is a multiplicity of human beings.
2. Particular human beings are individual in-
stances of the genus ‘‘human being’’ who are
equal autonomous subjects with equal rights.
3. The main problem in social philosophy is the
question of how a multitude of such autono-
mous and equal individuals can form a more
or less harmonious and peaceful society.
4. Such individuals undertake actual or potential
roles, functions without, however, any at-
tempt to grasp and place these in their differ-
ent contexts of social formations.
Sociality, thus defined by Levinas as the (always)
possible encounter with the Other in his/her
strangeness, is therefore distinct from society as
commonly understood. In Levinas, the social rela-
tion is not reduced to culture, race or a common
affiliation to land. Neither does he subscribe to the
various philosophies of the social contract in which
freedom is the basis of the social relation, or to those
philosophies in which autonomy of the will is the
basis. He does not reduce the human being to a mere
‘‘member of society (Levinas, 1998)’’. His account of
the social relation has its source in the sentiment of
the disquieting strangeness of the Other.
For a culture steeped in individualism and its
related key concepts of instrumentality, rationality
and autonomy, such a call of infinite responsibility
for others is at once challenging and disturbing.
Corporate legal responsibility: the Saying
and Said
In the context of corporate legal responsibility, it
seems to me that the most relevant of Levinas’s
notions is the distinction between what he calls the
Saying and the Said.8 So I must give a brief account
of it.
For Levinas the priority of ethics is based upon the
primordiality of language. The pursuit of justice
which is intrinsic to morality is tied up with language,
and is to be understood through the distinction
between the Saying and the Said.
In the context of the discussion here, one can
argue that the Said contains everything that comes
under a Code in the legal sense of the term, and the
Saying is the speech that inspires the spirit of the law.
In the context of a corporation and, according to
French’s terminology9, the Said is the Corporation’s
Internal Decisions Structure (CID) and the Saying is
the speech that inspires the CID. But the Saying is
always in excess of the Said as it is the condition of
the possibility of discourse; however, there is always
the threat of betrayal of the Saying by the Said. This
is the reason why Levinas warns us that the social
relation which supposes justice could be a more
vulnerable relation than the face-to-face relation, or
in other words, to forget the Saying is only to
pretend to close the others in a collective frame, to
reduce the human plurality to a multiplicity. At the
level of corporations this reduction implies that the
logic of the economic system – geared to capital
accumulation and profits always with exponential
growth and accountability to shareholders as its
targets – in which corporations operate, would not
readily go hand in hand with the Levinasian
requirements of responsibility for the Other. But the
precise virtue of approaching the matter from a
Levinasian perspective is that the latter forces one to
address the deficiencies of the theory of individual
responsibility in the context of liberalism and of the
market. Levinasian insights can help us to articulate
the relevance of responsibility on the part of
corporations to others beyond share-holders. One
can say that a corporation’s social interactions with
others fall, at least, into four categories:
1. Interchanges between individual agents.
2. Corporations interacting with individual
agents.
3. Corporations interacting with other corpora-
tions.
4. Corporations interacting with society.
Corporations in their relations and actions, as is
obvious and already mentioned, have far more
power and control over many others than individual
agents because they, by and large, structurally
constitute the situations in which individual agents
have to operate and make choices. For instance, in a
recent article in The Guardian, John Pilger (2001)
wrote about the inhuman conditions and low wages
in which people are forced to work and live, to be
able to survive under the dictum of globalisation,
where big companies, such as Gap or Nike exercise
their power, depriving the workers of a free and
dignified life.
However, the problem, as shown by the example
of the Herald of Free Enterprise, is that corporations
in the majority of the cases are typically insensitive to
such matters and ignore them.
In Otherwise than Being, Levinas presents the
notion of justice as one with a double structure –
justice as a question, and justice as a problem. From
the asymmetrical point of view, the Other always
has primacy, (apre`s vous, monsieur or ‘‘after you,
Sir’’). One starts the analysis with the question:
who goes in the first place? Who has primacy? In
the case of corporations and taking into account
what I have said previously about the four social
interactions with others, the answer to this question
is even more complex than in the case of individual
agents. However, as an example, one can ask: is it
more important to respond to the interests of the
share-holders and the pressures of competition or
to respond to the matter of the safety of passengers
by improving the safety of the equipment with
which the corporation runs its business? This
question is a question of justice. The responsibility
for the Other presupposes asymmetry, non-reci-
procity and disproportion.
The state which gives the possibility for justice is
not for Levinas the arbiter of power based on rela-
tions of force; it is not the state of the Leviathan.
And to judge is not to subsume the particular case
under a rule. The same can be said in relation to a
corporation, whose particular interests should not be
subjugated to corporate goals. In the specific case of
the Herald of Free Enterprise, the good service to
customers could not be neglected (especially in
matters relating to safety) in the name of particular
interests, namely the challenges of competition or
the pressure of shareholders to increased profits. A
corporation should be organised according to the
principle of justice, which means, following Levinas,
that if the responsibility for the Other ‘‘is the surplus
of my duties over my rights’’, then the order of
justice is one in which duties override rights.10 A
corporation is just in its relations when its social
interactions are based on the inequality of the ethical
relation; injustice begins when one loses sight of the
alterity of the Other and forgets that the corporation
is informed by my relation to the Other. Or as
Levinas says, ‘‘this means that nothing is outside of
the control of the responsibility of the one for the
other (OB: 159).’’ – concern for the law, concern for
justice, concern for the responsibility for the Other.
For Levinas, responsibility is given in the asym-
metrical relation between the I and Other. In saying
this, he is not denying the need for law, which is not
meant to relieve the agent of his/her responsibility
for the Other, but to ensure that this responsibility
does not transform itself to become injustice. This
means that interpersonal responsibility is extended to
all the others; the domain of the collective becomes
visible in the face-to-face relation. The aim of the
law is to do justice to all the others, without at the
same time neglecting the asymmetrical relationship
of the face-to-face.
We are not only responsible for the intended
consequences but also for the unintended conse-
quences of our actions, because the core of the Lev-
inasian notion of responsibility is an infinite
responsibility in the first person. Me, voici (here I am);
not only for the Other, but also for all the absent others
who look at me in the eyes of the Other.11 Equality is
the foundation of justice, but Levinasian justice is not
distributive justice, based on equality as proportion,
but based on an asymmetrical disproportion.12 It fol-
lows from what I have said before about the CID in a
corporation that a corporation chart is important.
However, this chart is not valuable in itself and needs
continuous questioning by the Saying, which means
that in the complex net of interdependent and
dependent relationships, a particular Other cannot be
privileged to the detriment of another, but that the
relations should be based on justice. The law sets upon
the Said, from which it is possible to judge. However,
this Said, codified, thematically treated, intrinsically
requires for completion the Saying, but this Saying is
not an origin, it is pre-originary, and non-synchron-
ised with the Said. It is in this paradoxical relation
between the two plans, indifferent to each other and
yet at the same time linked, that Levinas sees justice as a
problem.13 Against the peril of the degradation of
justice, Levinas argues:
In no way is justice a degradation of obsession, a
degeneration of the for-the-other, a diminution, a
limitation of anarchic responsibility, a neutralization of
the glory of the Infinite, a degeneration that would be
produced in the measure that for the empirical reasons
the initial duo would become a trio. (OB: 159)
The peril of this degeneration could come not from
equality but from equality reduced to uniformity, as
equality, which is the basis of justice, does not forget
the inequality of responsibility.
Justice in Levinas is against conatus or force, which
has neither boundaries nor limits. According to
Levinas the legal system in its formalism is inspired
by this inequality. However, this inequality and this
excess are not the origin of law, since the law pre-
supposes synchrony between a principle and its
consequence, between the general and the particu-
lar. Justice is and must be the domain of the visible,
nevertheless, Levinas permanently calls our attention
to the fact that before the law, there is the pre-
original, an-archaic responsibility for the others. This
reasoning when applied to a corporation means that
the corporation has responsibility for each party
which has a relationship to it, such as its customers,
and that such responsibility should not be defected
by or undermined in the name of rules, pressures,
economic growth or profits.
The central question in this discussion is the fact
that justice is not viewed as a formal or abstract
legality regulating society, with the mere aim of
producing social agreements by reducing conflicts. A
society regulated by abstract legality is without faces
and friendship; in other words, it is a society without
a true recognition of human diversity and difference,
in which economic abstraction and reification are
represented by so-called free and equal autonomous
individual.14 In Levinasian, terms this is a society
without proximity.15
But responsibility as proximity, doubtless, exerts
an enormous demand on me as a moral agent. It
leaves me with two stark options: either I answer the
call of the Other and through it discover the real
meaning of myself, or I completely turn my back on
such responsibility, thereby losing my true identity.
Identity in Levinas is not acquired by free choices,
but in the encounter with the Other as, ‘‘If I do not
answer for myself, who will answer? But if I only
answer for myself – will I still be myself’’?16 The
same reasoning can be applied to corporations,
which cannot be indifferent to the fate of the people
with whom they have relations, as its identity is
ultimately linked with the way that they are able to
respond to the different and multiple calls of the
Others as customers, share-holders, society, etc.
Furthermore, ‘‘the tie with the Other is knotted
only in responsibility’’.
Like the individual moral agent, it is through
responsibility that the corporation is able to discover
its true aim and meaning. Its identity is given in the
One for the Other, in the way it responds to the call
of others with whom it has relations.17 Such a per-
spective implies that ethics is an inherent part of
economic and corporate life. It is not simply a
consequence of actions good, bad or indifferent
performed by the individuals who form part of this
life, but also that such life is part of ethical life itself,
which is all embracing and all pervasive from which
no domain of human activities can be insulated. In
order to be human is to be responsible in this
demanding Levinasian sense. In repudiating or
shunning it, executive business suits must necessarily
lead dehumanised lives, pretending that the ethical
has no remit within their professional existence.
It is within institutions/corporations that we are
placed in relation with other individuals, but the link
which is established in the framework of an insti-
tution/corporation is organised ‘‘around something
(Levinas, 1982),’’ and as I have mentioned above, a
corporation is organised around a CID structure,
aims and projects. The contact between individuals
is not direct but through a common interest, an idea,
or a project, which sustains it. Therefore, one can
say that each individual belongs to a determinable
and objective context given the function or role that
he/she occupies in a particular social structure, as I
have mentioned in the case of the Herald of Free
Enterprise.
Levinas, in his analysis of society, takes into
consideration the work of Durkheim and identifies
in it an ‘‘elaboration of the fundamental categories
of the social ... starting from the main idea that the
social cannot be reduced to the sum of individual
psychologies (Levinas, 1990)’’. The individual is
not an abstract de-contextualised being; he/she
becomes a moral agent from the instant that he/she
places his/her centre of behaviour outside him/
herself and in this way his/her conduct indicates
their necessary commitment to the Other and all
others. Levinas appreciates the way that Durkheim
considered the spiritual/moral dimension of the
individual in its organicist dimension, in the sense
that the society is a whole, constituted by distinct
but interdependent parts. Levinas recognises in
Durkheim a ‘‘metaphysician’’ of the social, because
Durkheim is capable of demonstrating that society
is structured as a totality, which presupposes that a
social totality has its own reality, apart from that of
the individuals that constitute it. The social totality
defines the organisational systems of a social group,
be these economic or legal. In the ‘‘social of
Durkheim’’ Levinas recognises the value of the
social totality, as a structured whole. For Levinas,
the interest of Durkheim lies in the fact that for the
latter, the coexistence of individuals within a social
totality is not simply a bald fact, but that social
totality makes possible the elevation of the indi-
viduals to morality. This presupposes that the
individual and society are not separate and inde-
pendent of each other, but that human action can
only be understood within the complex nexus of
relations and interrelations in a determined context.
By analogy, this kind of Levinasian/Durkheimian
reasoning would enable one to argue that a corpora-
tion would only become a truly responsible agent if it
were to place its centre of gravitation outside its own
narrow limited interests. It would also enable one to
argue that a corporation is an entity with a complexity
of relations in a particular context in relation to which
it is possible to apply responsibilities (legal and moral)
for its actions.18 The difficulties in attributing criminal
responsibility to a corporation are not simply related to
the inadequacy of the law as it stands, but also
importantly to our cultural values, specifically shaped
by the standard current notions of individual freedom
and responsibility under which human actions are not
viewed as being interrelated and interdependent, but
as independent and unrelated. As a consequence, and
as I have been maintaining all along this article, our
Western culture is based on individual values, with a
prejudice against collective ones.
However, in spite of much possible agreement
with Durkheim, Levinas, nevertheless, differs from
and remains very critical of Durkheim. One of his
main criticisms is directed against Durkheim’s
excessive confidence in social institutions/corpora-
tions, because from an Levinasian point of view:
(totality), the State, politics, techniques, work at every
moment on the point of having their center of grav-
itation in themselves, and weighing on their own
account. (OB: 159)
From the point of view of totality the individuals are
not considered on their own, but they are seen
simply as elements of the system that overtakes them.
Against Durkheim, Levinas does not look for the
first element of morality in the elevation of the
individual to humanity through his /her participa-
tion in the social totality, but in inter-individual
relationship.19
The stress in the inter-individual relationship as
the basis of morality leads Levinas to maintain a
critical attitude towards social institutions, which, as
such, are indifferent to the fate of individuals. It is
precisely because the standard current account of
corporations lacks this critical Levinasian attitude
that the remit of their responsibility is distorted.
Corporations play their own game, with their
immanent logic, making sure they rationally
manipulate all other parties to advance their own
goals. When social relations are reduced to their
mere institutional forms, we arrive at an anonymous
world, or as Levinas says at an ‘‘in-humane neutrality
(De L’Existance a` L’Existant: 11).’’ It is this ‘‘neu-
trality’’ which is at the basis of the view that crimes
perpetrated by a corporation are not crimes, but
accidents. This is another reason why it is so difficult
to attribute criminal responsibility to corporations,
and it explains why in the case of the Herald of Free
Enterprise, it was not possible to apply the charge of
corporate criminality. Within their own limited
parameters, corporations cannot be faulted, as long as
they are faithful to their own immanent logic. The
present difficulty of attributing criminal responsibil-
ity to corporations is precisely due to a tacit, if not
explicit, acceptance of that logic and framework, a
deep-seated reluctance to question it from outside.
Ironically, a Durkheimian understanding would
simply reinforce such a status quo.
It is not the social totality on its own which
Levinas critiques, but the totalization understood as
an organisational system in which all forms of social
existence are reduced to the limited logic of insti-
tutions/corporations. Although individuals do not
disappear in the total order, their irreplaceable sin-
gularity is diminished, because a totalising system
reduces every social relation to a simple form of
participation in the social order.
In a corporation all relations are strictly dictated
by an internal order and regulated by a standardised
behaviour according to the ideology of the corpo-
ration or institution, and no deviation could be
entertained.
The Levinasian critique of social totality resists the
reduction of the social relation only to its objective
and institutional expression. The aim of his critique
is to alert liberal societies to the fact that totalization
is not a deviation of the contingency of the political
order but is a permanent threat. Levinas says:
A society respectful of liberties would not simply have
as a foundation ‘‘liberalism’’, objective theory of
society, which argues that it works better when things
are left alone. Such liberalism would make freedom
depend upon an objective principle and not from the
essential secret of lives. (E´thique et Infini: 73–74)
Levinas contends that no institution or corporation
could by its own means limit the extension of its
authority. Its boundaries come from the outside,
from the parole propre (speech), the Saying as the
confirmation of the agent’s singularity and at the
same time as the expression of my responsibility for
the Other and all the others.20 The Saying defines
the possibility for each agent to speak for him/her-
self, and in this way be ‘‘personally present’’ in his/
her speech.21
Conclusion
At this point one can say that corporate responsibility
is exercised when the singularity of the speech of
each agent is not systematically ignored in favour of
the established order, but is seriously taken into
account. This speech does not only translate the
agent’s desire to talk in its own name, but defines the
social relation, distinct from that of institutions/
corporations. In the words of Wilden this enables:
(the) creativity of labour potential that makes each of
us, not an abstract individual – not an economic
abstraction exchanging human value for monetary
exchange value, not a commodity in the economic
machinery worth a specific, competitively defined,
quantity of dollars per hour to a part of the system over
which we have no control – but a qualitatively dif-
ferentiated individual, inseparable in the long run from
our dependence on complex and undefinable sets of
nonexploitative communications and exchanges with
our fellow human beings… (1978: 122)
Speech is beyond the domain of the established or-
der and establishes significations. On the one hand, it
is the agent’s manifestation of his/her power of
rupture and on the other hand, it is the opening to
unpredictable directions. Responsibility at whatever
level – corporate or individual – is unconditional for
the Other and all the others. In order to be
responsible, as we have seen, is not a question of
choice, but a question of a deep liberty, the liberty of
taking the burden of the infinite responsibility for
the Other - customer, employees, community,
public at large, others.
The rupture with the established order instituted
by speech allows the existence within public space of
another type of social relation, other than the rela-
tion reproduced by the logic of any one social order
like that of a corporation. Speech disturbs order, but
does not propose another stable order in competi-
tion or in conformity with a given order. This dis-
obedience of the logic of the social order is a radical
protest but without connivance, because this protest
does not have the ambition to install a new order;
the only ‘‘ambition’’ is to give the first place to the
Other.
In the context of corporate legal responsibility,
Levinas may be said to be inviting society to make
corporations face up to their responsibility for the
Other, as well as at the same time to be inviting
corporations themselves to accept such responsibility
for the Other and, in so doing, to render themselves
truly free. In this sense, Levinas’s conception of
ethics as first philosophy and his aretaic account of
ethics constitute a genuine new paradigm.
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Notes
1 Two limitations immediately spring to mind. First,
it is true that Levinas himself had no interest in the le-
gal issue of corporate responsibility per se. However, as
legal responsibility (especially in the law of homicide)
overlaps with moral responsibility, there is nothing in
principle objectionable to extending his insight regard-
ing moral responsibility to the area of the law. Second,
the scope of his responsibility is only responsibility for
the Other human being. As Llewelyn (1991: 114)
points out: ‘‘(Levinas) is so preoccupied with doing jus-
tice to the human being that he fails to do justice to the
non-human being, for despite his rare references to our
responsibility ‘‘for everything’’... these go unexplained
and stand out as anomalies in writings which say or im-
ply that direct, unmediated responsibility is responsibil-
ity to the other human being.’’ But for the purpose of
this paper, the latter objection will just be noted, as
acknowledging it is not necessarily so damaging.
2 For details of this disaster, see Department of Trans-
port, Report of Court No. 8074 (1987). This report,
will be referred to, for short, as the Sheen Report. In
brief outline, the salient facts of the case and the findings
of the Sheen Report are as follows: The day 6th March
of 1987 was a terrible day for the passengers of the Roll
on/Roll off ferry Herald of Free Enterprise. The ferry cap-
sized in the approaches to the Belgian port of Zeebrugge
en route to Dover in England at 19.05 local time. There
was a light easterly breeze and the sea was calm. The
ship had a crew of 80 and carried 459 passengers, 81
cars, 3 buses, and 47 trucks. After leaving the harbour,
90 s later, she capsized ending on her side half-sub-
merged in shallow water. Only an accidental movement
to starboard in her last moments prevented her from
sinking totally in deeper water. After the capsize, a cou-
rageous search and rescue operation was raised. At least
150 passengers and 38 members of the crew died from
hypothermia, many of them inside the ship or in the
frozen water. Many others were injured. The rescuers
soon realised that the Herald of Free Enterprise had left the
Zeebrugge port with her bow doors open. The design
of the Roll on/Roll off ferry boats are essentially pon-
toons covered by a superstructure, with bow and stern
doors which provide the means for vehicles to drive on
and off via adjustable ramps at the dock. The speed of a
ferry loading and unloading is improved for a Roll on/
Roll off ship, abbreviating the time a ship spends in
port. The Sheen Report identified five faults related to
safety as the direct cause of the disaster: (a) pressure to
leave the berth immediately after the loading; (b) exces-
sive number of passengers; (c) lack of indicator lights –
‘‘there is no indicator on the bridge as to whether the
most important watertight doors are closed or not’’; (d)
failure to ascertain the ship’s draught: ‘‘The ship’s
draught is not read before sailing, and the draught en-
tered into the Official Log Book is completely errone-
ous. It is not standard practice to inform the Master of
his passenger figure before sailing. Full speed is main-
tained in dense fog’’; (e) inadequate capacity of the bal-
last pumps. The existing pump took 1.30 min to empty
the tanks, which meant that the ferry could not get back
on to an even keel until it was well out to sea. A new
pump would only have cost £25,000, but the Company
regarded this as prohibitive. The Report found that
‘‘(f)rom top to bottom the body corporate was infected
with the disease of sloppiness’’. The board of directors
ignored the several recommendations about the safety
management of their vessels. Yet, as far as culpability
was concerned, the Sheen Report found Captain David
Lewry and Mr Leslie Sabel (the Chief Officer) to have
been ‘‘guilty of serious negligence causative of the casu-
ality. Both these officers have suffered the penalty of
having their Certificates suspended (The Sheen Report,
74).’’ In the light of that, the ‘‘Court does not wish to
impose on them a heavy financial penalty. (ibid)’’ As for
Townsend Car Ferries Limited, the Report merely
concluded that it had no way of marking its ‘‘heavy
responsibility for the disaster’’ than paying the sum of
£350,000 towards the payment of the costs of the
Court’s investigation into the whole tragedy. Justice
Sheen significantly remarked: ‘‘That seems to me to
meet the justice of the case (The Sheen Report,
74–75).’’
3 The dominant tradition of Western philosophy
views freedom as the most valuable source of morals
and politics. Levinas is very critical of this extreme con-
fidence in freedom. In TI: 82–84, he devotes an entire
section to this matter, ‘‘Freedom called into Question’’.
For him, it is not freedom, which is constitutive of the
human agent and its identity. For him, morality does
not have its source in freedom; instead ‘‘morality begins
when freedom, instead of being justified by itself, feels
itself to be arbitrary and violent (TI: 84).’’ This is to
recognise a principle not only of autonomy, but also
heteronomy as the source of all morality, the presence
of the Other. The negative sense of heteronomy in
Kantian philosophy acquires a positive value in the
philosophy of Levinas. However, the autonomy of the
human agent is not denied in the philosophy of Levinas
but must be seen in relation to heteronomy when I am
confronted with the non-me in my self and outside of
myself. For Kant, the source of morality is the auton-
omy of the will, but for Levinas, it is the relation to the
irreducible exteriority of the face, as we shall see in a
moment. (On Levinas’s relation to Kant, see Peperzak
(1997: 198–200) and Hayat (1995: 54–56).
4 For now, no further elucidation or comment will
be made of this notion, as a more suitable place to elab-
orate and discuss it is the next section, where a few
more Levinasian concepts will also be introduced.
5 In the next section, the related distinction between
the Saying and the Said will be discussed.
6 Note that this is the very title of the second major
oeuvre of Levinas.
7 See Levinas (1991) in Entre Nous.
8 Otherwise Than Being goes beyond TI (which
conceives language as playing a central role in ethical
relations because the encounter with the Other always
involves speech) in maintaining that the exposure to the
Other effected in saying is at the very core of ethical rela-
tions; language is neither condition nor source of Saying,
but Saying itself. The Other who faces me awakens me to
a dimension beyond the universe of beings and their
Being. In speaking to somebody I transcend the realm of
Being by accepting that my being is meant to be there for
the Other: ‘‘To say is to approach a neighbour, ‘dealing
him signifyingness’. This is not exhausted in ‘ascriptions
of meaning’, which are inscribed, as tales, in the said.
Saying taken strictly is a ‘signifyingness dealt the other’,
prior to all objectification; it does not consist in giving
signs. (OB: 48).’’
9 See French (1984) and also, Werhane et al. (2003).
10 See OB: 159.
11 This point refers to the Levinasian notion of ‘‘the
third’’. In this article I cannot go into further details of
the complexities involved. For further discussion, see
Bernasconi (1999), Purcell (1996), Faessler (1984).
12 To possible objections to this point, see as defence,
Critchley (1992: 232).
13 See OB: 161.
14 On this point, see Critchley (1992).
15 Proximity is the term Levinas uses to refer to the
immediacy on confronting the face of the Other.
Proximity is felt as immediate contact which demands
a response and hence, that it amounts to responsibility,
that is to say the ability to respond.
16 Levinas (1972: 95).
17 See, Soares (2003) and Stone (1975).
18 See, Davies (2002) and Quingley (2004).
19 ‘‘The social relation is not a relationship initially
which goes beyond the individual, with something
more than the sum of the individuals and superior to
the individual, in the Durkheimian sense (De L’Exi-
stance a` L’Existant: 161).’’ [My translation]
20 See TI: 296.
21 See TI: 296.
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